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1 Introduction
Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In contrast to
private contracts, public contracts are open to challenge by third parties. A whiff of corruption
and a concern for the misuse of other people’s monies are all that is required to make a challenge
to a public contract feasible.1
Third parties, nonetheless, may opportunistically take advantage of procedural mecha-
nisms designed to hold politicians and public managers accountable (McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast 1989). Although the awarding and performance of a public contract may be honest
and legal, public agents fear politically motivated challenges.2 Since the public at large cannot
distinguish ultimately whether a challenge is honest or opportunistic, public agents will treat
every challenge as a political threat, and therefore will ex ante adjust the nature of contracts
to limit those features whose probity may be questioned. In this paper, we show that as a
way to reduce the potential for challenges, public agents will adjust the contracts with more
specificity in procurement and more rule-based rigidity in implementation.3
Such contractual adaptations, however, come at a cost. Contractors’ perceptions of over-
rigidity will translate into higher prices and stronger compensation clauses. The contractual
adaptation required to limit the potential for third-party challenges, whether opportunistic
or not, make public contracting look “inefficient.” We show that public contracts cannot be
evaluated vis-a`-vis private contracts, but should be compared with analogous public contracts
in similar political environments to assess their efficiency.
1 A challenge to a public contract is an objection, either informally through the media or formally in a
court, as to the probity posed by transactions conducted in the public sector and typically carries an an implicit
demand for proof of the validity of the contracting process (Williamson 1999).
2 Consider the Hetch Hetchy aqueduct, an extraordinary water and power system comprising 60 miles of
tunnels through solid granite, 280 miles of pipelines, four major dams and powerhouses, two treatment plants,
and 11 reservoirs. Michael O’Shaughnessy, tenured chief engineer of the City of San Francisco, opined in his
account of the project: “I never handled any proposition where the engineering problems were so simple and
the political ones so complex” (Hennessey 2012, p. 7; emphasis added).
3 For example, a forestry company in Latin America contracted the construction and maintenance of a 60
kilometer (37 miles) network of six roads for heavy trucks within its forests. The life of the contract was for
five years or until a predetermined volume of lumber was carried on the network, whichever occurred first. The
payment schedule specified a unit price per kilometer and the timing (on completion of road foundation, on
completion of the road, and in monthly installments). The contract specified building standards (such as width
and thickness of asphalt), service standard requirements, and penalties for deviations from these requirements.
This private road construction contract was ten pages long (Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic 2014, Box 3.1).
Comparable public contracts usually are several hundred pages long because public administrators have to take
into account, among others, all possible third-party claims.
2
A higher level of contract rigidity in public contracts can therefore be understood as a
signaling device and political risk adaptation by public agents. As Goldsmith and Eggers (2004,
122) indicate, “when something goes wrong in a public sector network, it tends to end up on
the front page of the newspaper, instantly transforming a management issue into a political
problem.” In Capitol Hill parlance, political risk adaptation is typically referred to as the
“Washington Post test,” a commonly used phrase by politicians when working on a project:
“How would it look on the front page on the Washington Post?” However, it is not only
civic-oriented legislation that limits public agents’ discretionary actions, but also that public
agents hedge their exposure to the risk of third parties’ challenges through contract rigidity:
Although they could rightly impose flexible terms to make the contract more efficient, they
opt not to, and thus signal probity and avoid potential challenges which may lead to expensive
litigation and loss of public support.
We provide a formalization of the interaction between political contestability and contract-
ing to understand the organizational foundations of pricing, specificity, and rigidity—the outer
features—of public contracts. Our framework is rooted in a transaction cost-cum-positive po-
litical theory, and introduces third-party opportunism (Spiller 2008) as a key hazard of public
transactions.
Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 9) emphasize that the link “between procurement and regu-
lation and the associated administrative and political constraints is still unknown to us or is
still in a state of conjecture. [...] Institutions are endogenous and should as much as possible
be explained by primitive considerations.” We present a positive explanation—which comple-
ments extant normative theories—of greater rigidities in public contracts relative to private
contracts in politically contestable markets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we relate our contribution
to the main strands of literature regarding public contracting rigidity. In section 3, we introduce
a simple theoretical model that captures the trade-off between the risks of opportunistic third-
party challenges and contractual costs. In section 4, we explain the implications of budget
constraints for public contracts bid prices. In section 5, we provide various applications of our
framework. Section 6 concludes and advances a novel set of empirically testable predictions
relevant to public contracting and management.
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2 Related Literature
Public contract rigidity relates to three strands of literature: public administration, industrial
organization, and political economy.
According to the public administration literature, public contracting inefficiencies are as-
sociated with the large number of formal processes that appear to be essential to ensure the
public sector’s functions—in addition to “red tape,” i.e., costly and compulsory rules, regula-
tions, and procedures with no efficacy for their functional object (Bozeman 1993). Bureaucrats
are employed only for “hard” agency problems where consumers cannot be trusted (Prender-
gast 2003). Extensive rules and regulations arise from dividing authority among the separate
branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) to prevent abuses of power, protect
people’s rights (Baldwin 1990), and reflect values rooted in equity (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer,
and Boyer 2010).
Red tape regulations are intended to decrease public agents’ uncertainty about how they
should behave (Kurland and Egan 1999). Both formalities and red tape are the instruments by
which bureaucracies restrict public agents’ discretion (Boyne 2002; Lan and Rainey 1992) and
“overcome the temptation to capitulate to consumers simply to avoid complaints” (Prendergast
2003, 932).
As emphasized by scholars of industrial organization, public contract pricing is fundamen-
tally determined by informational costs that arise from informational asymmetries, the extent
of the verifiability of information, and the presence of repeated interactions (Bajari and Tadelis
2001; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Loeb and Surysekar 1994; Macaulay 1963). When terms can
be contested by excluded sellers, bidding specifications and agreements are carefully delimited
such that they are governed by more formal features (Marshall, Meurer, and Richard 1994a).
More information disclosure to bidders, however, may be welfare detrimental. Under
costly and competitive bidding, public agents may find it optimal to introduce noise into the
information that they communicate to bidders, when more precise information fine-tunes the
accuracy of submitted offers, but also severely diminishes bidders’ expected profit Coleff and
Garc´ıa (2017).
Political economists have also studied the engagement of interested parties (McCubbins
and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiz-
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tondo 1999) and consumers (Prendergast 2003) as instruments of oversight, where independent
third-party scrutiny is always desirable. Both honest and opportunistic challenges may have
positive welfare effects, e.g., lowering corruption (de Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999;
Spiller 1990; Spiller and Urbiztondo 1994).
In sum, the extant view is that public contract rigidity responds to the risks of corruption
and renegotiation, the procurer and contractors’ asymmetric information, and the presence of
different (and possibly conflicting) government objectives. By adding ad hoc assumptions—
such as insufficient commitment that leads to renegotiation (Guasch, Laffont, and Straub
2008)—the aforementioned frameworks applied to study public contracts equate them with
imperfect private contracts. These prevailing theories of public contracting ignore, however,
the costs of political contestability and fall short of incorporating the opportunistic motives of
third parties and their anticipation by public officials.
3 A Model of Procurement under Political Contestability
3.1 Political Hazards into Rigidity
Consider the following example. Large parking lots can be private (e.g., in shopping malls)
or public (e.g., provided by the city). Municipalities often contract out the development and
management of public parking lots to private operators. ?) compare procurement contracts
for parking lots in France in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private
corporation and find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-
to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political
risks are more salient. This proceduralization makes contract less adaptable and more costly
in their design and implementation. In this section, we present a model that captures the
trade-offs between contracting and political costs faced by public agents.
We focus our analysis on the public agent’s perspective. Furthermore, we ignore sunk
costs to abstract them from governmental opportunism4 and to make the argument regarding
political contestability and third-party opportunism straightforward.
4 See Spiller (2008) and the references therein.
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There are two agents explicitly involved and two agents implicitly involved in public
contracting:
1. The incumbent public agent,
2. Private contractors,
3. Third-party challengers, i.e., political opponents to the incumbent administration, com-
petitors of the contractor, and interest groups, and
4. The public at large, i.e., voters and courts.
Whereas third parties and the public at large may be concerned about purely private contracts
in as much as these contracts educe externalities, they are certainly concerned about public
contracts because of the social implications and public monies involved, which sanction the
third parties’ implicit mandate to scrutinize the public agent. In other words, third parties
are always present in public procurement as an interested (and often opportunistic) checker of
the proper allocation of public resources.
The signaling process begins in the preparatory stage before the contract is signed. The
public agent receives the project features and budget to contract for goods and services. The
public agent also perceives the threat of potential third-party challenges and tries to mini-
mize the political risks and maintain political support through the rigidity of the proposed
procurement process and contract.
Potential private contractors may not be directly aware of the hazards faced by the public
agent, but they observe the contract’s rigidity. Rigidity represents less adaptability, higher
contracting and implementation costs, and thus higher bid prices.
Third parties privately perceive the benefits of a challenge. The features of the contract
affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting whether they place a challenge.
Finally, we model the reaction of voters and courts to a challenge in a stochastic fashion,
such that the probability of a successful challenge also depends on the rigidity of the public
contract. A successful challenge may imply weakened chances of re-election or re-appointment
for incumbent public agents, a judicial challenge, or loss of reputation and current position.
Figure 1 presents the timing of the signaling process (and the associated information set)
from third-party hazards into contract rigidity.
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Public agent:
1. Receives project features and budget
2. Perceives threat of potential TPO challenges
3. Minimizes political risks through contract specificity and rigidity
 t0
Private contractors:
4. Observe contract rigidity
5. Less adaptability indicates higher contracting and implementation costs
and therefore a higher final price
 t1
Third parties:
6. Privately perceive the benefits from a potential challenge
7. Contract features affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting po-
litical outcomes
 t2
Figure 1: This figure presents the timing of a sequential game where political hazards to the incumbent
public agent posted by (opportunistic) third parties translates into contract specificity and rigidity.
3.2 Conceptualizing Contract Specificity and Rigidity
Contract specificity refers to the ex ante complexity of the subject and the completeness of the
clauses, technical provisions, and processing costs (Laffont and Tirole 1993). Contract rigidity
refers to rule-based and bureaucratic implementation, i.e., ex post enforcement, penalties,
hardness, and intolerance to adaptation in a contract5 and normally correlates with contract
specificity: the more specific a contract is, the more rigid its implementation and enforcement
are expected to be.
Complex contracts have more contractual rigidities than simpler contracts, and the cost
of enforcing contracts ex post increases with complexity. Because the public sector has more
ambiguous objectives than private organizations (Boyne 2002) and it is sometimes difficult to
assess to what extent these objectives are achieved (Lan and Rainey 1992), public contracts’
high rigidity mitigates ambiguity and problematic evaluation. For example, U.S. Department
of Defense’s directives specify source selection policies in great detail, including the develop-
ment of objective technical, cost, schedule, manufacturing, performance, and risk criteria; the
auction techniques; the organization of a selection committee; and the degree of subcontract-
ing.6 Public agents must also formulate their own standards of evidence and follow their own
5 In this regard, contract rigidity is the opposite of a “best efforts” clause.
6 See the U.S. Department of Defense’s memorandum on “Source Selection Procedures,” issued on March
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rules to avoid discriminating on the basis of non-verifiable information (Laffont and Tirole
1993).
3.3 Modeling Hazards, Rigidity, and Pricing
To operationalize political contestability and third-party scrutiny in public contracting, we in-
troduce a simple model and notations.7 The incumbent public agent faces political challenges
of cost T0 with (endogeneous) likelihood ρ, and the likelihood that these political challenges
will be successful (in court and/or vis-a`-vis the public at large) is represented by likelihood τ .8
Third-party challenges arise from honest efforts to control costs and from opportunistic at-
tempts to replace the public agent; however, the types of challenges are not distinguishable ex
ante, thus public agents treat all challenges as political threats.
Public agents’ contracting costs have two components: expected political costs E(T )—
concomitant with loss of office, reputation, and support—that arise from discretionary contract
terms (flexible contracting); and the costs of adaptation to contract specifications K. If a
challenge is successful, there are also costs associated with the financial and social costs of a new
bid, i.e., time and documentation and settlement payments (Marshall, Meurer, and Richard
1994b).9 We highlight political costs as a crucial burden for public agents with respect to third-
party challenges. The more discretionary the contract terms are, the more room there is for
third parties to challenge the contract. Therefore, expected political costs due to third-party
(both honest and opportunistic) challenges E(T ) can be mitigated by contract rigidity R.10
The likelihood of success of a challenge τ is common knowledge to all of the players.
Rigidity turns into a signaling device of the public agent’s probity: It is more difficult to prove
wrongdoing when there is less room for discretionary actions and, therefore, the likelihood of
success of a TPO challenge τ decreases with rigidity R. In other words, courts are more likely
to dismiss and the public is more likely to ignore challenges to contracts with strictly followed
rigid specifications. τ captures a critical institutional feature to the TPO game, which we
4, 2011 and available at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA007183-10-DPAP.pdf (accessed
May 19, 2011).
7 See Appendix A for a glossary of notations and abbreviations.
8 We model the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge τ as purely stochastic, although decreasing in the
extent of rigidity, without modeling the decision process of the court and the public at large.
9 Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1994a) argue that allowing excluded bidders to challenge the outcome of
a procurement process inefficiently reduces sole-sourcing.
10 R = 0 denotes the minimum rigidity inherent to relational contracts.
8
formalize in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 The likelihood of success of an opportunistic challenge at court τ is convex
and monotonically decreasing in R, such that ∂τ
∂R
< 0 and ∂
2τ
∂R2
≥ 0.11
Likewise, an opportunistic challenger will be forced to incur higher monetary and political
costs to screen for eventual contractual weaknesses that could be challenge at court, the more
lengthy, numerous, and convoluted the contractual clauses are. In other words, rigid clauses
signal costly litigation to the challenger. Therefore, the cost of challenge and litigation c for
the challenger increases with rigidity R.12
Expected political costs E(T ) depend on the actual costs of a successful challenge to
the incumbent public agent—including the costs of a new bid (documentation and analyses),
externalities,13 and the harm to the public agent’s reputation—and on the likelihood of a
challenge being successful, i.e.:
Definition 1 E(T ) = T0ρτ
where T0 is the public agent’s actual cost if a TPO challenge is successful. Larger projects are
associated with potentially larger TPO costs to the public agent and are therefore linked to a
higher T0. Third parties calculate the benefits from opportunistic challenges, but the public
agent does not know ex ante the particular value of these benefits for third parties. Third
parties’ overall benefits from an opportunistic challenge correspond to a random variable T˜0,
which is distributed normally with mean µ and variance σ2.
From the third parties’ perspective, the realization of TPO benefits is subject to winning
the challenge with likelihood τ and also subject to the competitive environment. TPO benefits
may not be internalized entirely by the challenger, but are distributed to all third parties
involved. We model third parties’ competitive environment with concentration parameter ζ ∈
11 Proofs are presented in Appendix B.
12 The heuristic observation that the challenger’s cost of litigation rises in contractual rigidity (∂c/∂R > 0)
is sufficient, but not necessary for our results. I.e., the propositions presented hereinafter hold for any positive
cost of litigation (c > 0).
13 The value of lost time for users would be such an externality. For example, highway repairs generate
significant negative externalities for commuters through increased gridlock and commuting times. Lewis and
Bajari (2011) use the example of Interstate 35W, a main commuting route in Minneapolis that carries over
175,000 commuters per day. If a highway construction project results in a 30-minute delay each way for
commuters on this route, the daily social cost imposed by the construction is 175,000 hours. If one values time
at $10 an hour, the social cost is $1.75 million per day. Most public contracts carry externalities for the public
at large.
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(0, 1]. If ζ = 1, the TPO challenger’s benefits are symmetrical to the incumbent public agent’s
TPO costs (e.g., a two-party political market); if ζ < 1, the political market is fragmented,
and the challenger does not internalize all the benefits from a successfully protested contract.
Thus, from the public agent’s perspective, the expectation of benefits to an opportunistic
challenger, T˜ , is given by the random benefits of an opportunistic challenge, the likelihood
of the challenge being successful, and the internalization of benefits by the challenger, i.e.,
T˜ = T˜0τζ.
The public agent affects the likelihood of challenge ρ by adjusting rigidity R. The likeli-
hood of a TPO challenge ρ is given by the probability of a positive expected benefit for third
parties. I.e., ρ is the probability that third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic
challenge will be higher than the cost of challenge c: ρ = Pr(T˜ > c).
An increase in rigidity R thus has two effects:
1. It lowers the likelihood of success of a TPO challenge τ ; thus, for any given continu-
ous distribution function of third parties’ expected political benefits from a challenge,
it yields a scalar transformation distribution function that is first-order stochastically
dominated by the distribution function at lower rigidity (downward probabilistic shift of
the cumulative distribution curve of expected third-party opportunism benefits T˜ )
2. It increases the cost of challenge c and thus it decreases the probability at which an
opportunistic challenge pays off (rightward move of the cost of litigation)
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the combination of these two effects that result
in a decrease in the likelihood of challenge ρ due to an increase in contract rigidity R.
Therefore, the likelihood of opportunistic challenge ρ is given by the probability of a
positive expected value of a challenge Pr(T˜ − c > 0). The public agent adjusts R ex ante
according to her beliefs regarding the likelihood of incidence ρ and the likelihood of success τ
of third-party challenges. The public agent’s rational expectation of ρ is consistent with third
parties’ costs and their strategic decisions, i.e., E(q | R) ≡ Pr[T˜0ζτ(R) > c(R)] ≡ ρ.
Proposition 2 For any T˜0, the likelihood of challenge ρ is decreasing in rigidity R.
Proposition 3 Expected political costs E(T ) are decreasing and convex in rigidity R.
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Figure 2: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) that a challenge will not be filed because
the expected benefits (x axis) are below the cost of litigation (c): the blue solid line shows the results
for low rigidity contracts, and the red dotted line shows the results for high rigidity contracts. In the
numerical simulation, we show low rigidity RL = 10, high rigidity RH = 30, a normal distribution of
benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties T˜0 that ranges from 0 to 100 with µ = 30
and σ = 20, τ = ln[exp(1) + R]−1, ζ = 1, and cost of litigation c = γR + 10, where γ = 0.2 and
10 are calibration parameters for an increase of c in R. The likelihood of a TPO challenge ρ is the
complementary cumulative probability of the third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic
challenge being lower than the cost of challenge, i.e., ρ = Pr(T˜ − c > 0). The cumulative distribution
function at high rigidity is first-order stochastically dominated by the cumulative distribution function
at low rigidity. An increase in rigidity R from 10 to 30 induces a decrease in the likelihood of a TPO
challenge from 0.5 to 0.1.
Figure 3 plots the equilibrium likelihood of opportunistic challenge ρ for different levels of
rigidity R. The intuition that E(T ) falls in R is that the likelihood of a successful TPO
challenge can be reduced to negligible by extreme contract rigidity.
The presence of asymmetric information between the public agent and the third parties
implies that the public agent has some discretion in defining the specifications. Most pub-
lic procurements are bid by several bidders, thus generally specifications do not preclude a
competitive bidding market.14
14 In the event that over-detailed specifications are designative (i.e., they indicate a particular bidder), such
specifications can be a source of favoritism, i.e., biasing the specifications (or scoring rule) in favor of one bidder
(Lambert-Mogiliansky and Kosenok 2009). Except for times of emergency (e.g., there may be need to expedite
the procurement in case of natural disasters or national security), these are a natural signal of corruption. First,
most public contracts’ specifications are non-designative, i.e., they do not point to any particular bidder and
do not preclude a competitive bidding market. Second, we focus on the contractual stage, at which there is no
profit for the corrupted public agent to reduce the discretion of the favored bidder.
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Figure 3: This graph plots the equilibrium likelihood of an opportunistic challenge ρ for different levels
of rigidity R for identical distribution functions of third parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic
challenge and identical costs of challenge following the numerical simulation presented in Figure 2.
Contract design (ex ante), and implementation and enforcement (ex post) costs are a
function of time, skills (i.e., lawyers, engineers, and consultants), effort (e.g., documentation
and control), and expected penalties due to contractual deviations. Most of these costs—i.e.,
expected penalties and adaptation costs—are borne directly by the contractor (Kpr) and in-
corporated into the contract price; the remainder (e.g., excess administrative costs) is borne
by the public administration (Kpu) and externalized to the public at large through taxation.
It is a standard result in public finance that the efficiency cost of a tax (i.e., the excess burden
of taxation) increases with the square of the tax rate (Harberger 1971; Judd 1987). Since
contractual rigidity is a tax on adaptation—what Laffont and Tirole (1993) call “processing
costs”—the same convexity applies to rigidity R as well. Small rigidity have very small dis-
torting effects; large rigidity have very large negative effects. Thus, adaptation costs K—both
public and private—increase convexly in R.
Proposition 4 Adaptation costs K are strictly and monotonically rising in rigidity R, such
that ∂K
∂R
> 0 and ∂
2K
∂R2
> 0.
The price bid by a contractor is the sum of operating (technology-specific) and adaptation
costs (contract-specific and subject to rigidity R). A contractor’s maximum bid price is the
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reservation price P bud. To simplify our argument, we assume a uniform technology across firms
and a competitive (or Bertrand competition) bidding market, such that the resulting price P
is the lowest possible cost and follows private adaptation costs Kpr. We also assume away
governmental opportunism, i.e., direct or incremental expropriation by the public agent (Iossa
and Martimort 2015).
3.4 Existence of an Internal Equilibrium
We define the following objective functions for the agents:
Incumbent public agent: minimize
R
E[T (R) | τ ] +K(P,R)
subject to K = Kpr(R) +Kpu(P,R), P
bud ≥ Kpr
Private contractor: maximize
P
(P −Kpr) | R
subject to P bud ≥ P ≥ Kpr
Third-party challengers: maximize
q∈{0,1}
q(T0ζτ − c) | R
(1)
The bid price P equals Kpr | R, which also minimizes Kpu | R. The expected third party
benefits from an opportunistic challenge are given by T0, ζ, τ , and c. T0 is the particular
realization of T˜0, which is known to third parties but is unobserved by the public agent. If the
challenge is realized (q = 1), the expected third parties’ benefits equal T0ζτ − c.
15
The public agent internalizes expenses related to the contract; i.e., at the end, she is
accountable—directly or indirectly—for all the costs that are borne. She must pay the con-
tractors’ costs and her own costs, while aiming at minimizing the political costs. Therefore,
the optimal level of rigidity R∗ is driven by the expected political costs, the actual adaptation
costs, knowledge about τ , and the public agent’s beliefs about ρ.
Given T0, T˜0, τ , c, ζ, and K, the equilibrium {q
∗, ρ∗, R∗, P ∗} is such that:
(a) R∗ = argminR[T0ρ(R)τ(R) +K(P,R)]
(b) ρ∗ ≡ E(q∗ | R∗) ≡ Pr[T˜0ζτ(R
∗) > c(R∗)]
(c) P ∗ ∈ [Pmin, P bud] = Kpr | R
∗
Intuitively, this solution can be derived backwards. Starting from R∗, any deviation from
equilibrium makes the public agent worse off:
15 From the perspective of opportunistic third parties, the uncertainty is not in the benefits but in the
likelihood of success of the challenge.
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(a) If R < R∗, then τ(R) > τ(R∗) and c(R) < c(R∗); therefore ρ > ρ∗ and E[T (R)] −
E[T (R∗)] > K(P,R∗)−K(P,R), i.e., the increase in political costs E(T ) offsets the gains
from the decrease in contracting costs K.
(b) If R > R∗, then E[T (R∗)]−E[T (R)] < K(P,R)−K(P,R∗), i.e., the increase in contracting
costs K outmatches the gains from the decrease in political costs E(T ).
Lemma 1 The sum of the expected political costs E(T ) plus the adaptation costs K is U-shaped
and has an interior global minimum at R∗.
If E(T ) does not fall faster in R than K increases in R for low R states, political contesta-
bility is irrelevant for the outcome of the contract (i.e., it is a relational contract). If political
contestability is a relevant hazard for the public agent, Lemma 1 implies that the optimal
contract is partly flexible and of finite rigidity. A contract that is too flexible would be too
risky politically, whereas a contract that is too rigid would be too expensive. Figure 4 plots
an example of expected third-party opportunism costs E(T ) falling in rigidity and specificity
R, costs borne by the contractor Kpr and adaptation costs K rising in R, and the U-shaped
sum of E(T ) +K as the objective function that the public agent minimizes.
Corollary 1 With political contestability and third-party scrutiny, the sequential equilibrium
public contract that minimizes political and contracting costs is rigid and thus more expensive
in its design, implementation, and control than the theoretical first-best public contract in the
absence of TPO.
A direct outcome of Corollary 1 is that the higher E(T ) is, ceteris paribus, the higher R∗
and P will be.
3.5 Endogeneity of Opportunistic Challenge
The endogeneity of an opportunistic challenge provides contractual properties that are consis-
tent with observations in public contracting practice:
(a) Larger contracts are associated with higher expected political benefits for opportunistic
third parties (higher mean µ) and, therefore, are associated with a higher likelihood of
challenge ρ. Similarly, ρ increases in the proximity to elections, because potential political
gains are discounted at a higher factor.
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Figure 4: This graph plots expected political costs E(T ) (red solid line) that are falling in rigidity
and specificity R, costs borne by the contractor Kpr (blue dashed line) and adaptation costs K (blue
double-solid line) rising in R, and the U-shaped sum of E(T ) +K (green dotted line) as the objective
function that the public agent minimizes. The contracting sets of price and rigidity are given by the
area above the costs borne by the contractor Kpr and below the public agent’s reservation price P
bud.
Pmin is the equilibrium price for public contracts in a competitive bidding market.
(b) Inherent public-private information asymmetries increase with transactional complexity.
The dispersion of third parties’ beliefs about the expected political benefits from an op-
portunistic challenge σ is higher with high informational asymmetry (low scrutiny) states
than in low informational asymmetry states, i.e., in North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (2009)
“open-access” orders.
(c) When third parties’ beliefs about the expected political benefits from an opportunistic
challenge are more dispersed, a low cost of litigation c leads to a lower ρ and a high c leads
to a higher ρ.
(d) ρ is sensitive to the institutional environment that determines τ and c: the higher τ is,
the higher ρ is; the higher c is, the lower ρ is; and the more τ decreases in R, the more ρ
falls in R.
(e) The rule of law implies, ceteris paribus, a higher ρ.
(f) The lower bound of ρ depends on the third parties’ priors, i.e., the propensity to litigation
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that is proper for the institutional framework.
(g) Exogenous institutional changes (e.g., new environmental norms or amendments to the
legal system) alter τ and c and produce a new cumulative probability of challenge distri-
bution that will first-order stochastically dominate the former distribution when the legal
system becomes more restrictive (i.e., an increase in clauses subject to challenge) or will
be first-order stochastically dominated by the former distribution following deregulation.
3.6 Scrutiny: A Two-Sided Sword
Coleff and Garc´ıa (2017) show that more information disclosure to bidders is welfare detri-
mental when there are entry costs associated with bidding for public contracts. More precise
information guarantees that only accurate offers are submitted, but also induces harsh com-
petition and severely limits the expected profits for any given seller. By backward induction,
sellers decide not to enter the auction if they do not expect to extract positive rents. To balance
these two concerns, the public agent finds it optimal to introduce noise into the information
that she communicates to bidders.
In our political contestability setup, we find a similar result with a caveat on the cost
of submitting (opportunistic) challenges. An increase in scrutiny (i.e., critical public observa-
tion and accountability through transparency and public participation) lowers the information
asymmetry between the actual political costs for an incumbent public agent and third parties’
beliefs about the political benefits of an opportunistic challenge. Increased scrutiny induces a
calibration of beliefs about the expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (lower stan-
dard deviation), which yields a second-order stochastically dominant distribution (see Figure
5) with the inflection point at the mean expected benefits (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
1995). Thus, with all else kept constant (particularly with the mean expected benefits at low
scrutiny kept equal to the mean expected benefits at high scrutiny), an increase in scrutiny
leads to an increase in the likelihood of challenge ρ at low litigation costs c and to a reduction
in ρ at high c.
Increased transparency brings the information of a public agent and third parties into sym-
metry. Consequently, a public agent can better forecast third parties’ reaction to her project
and choice of R. This knowledge prompts a counter-intuitive implication: increased scrutiny
increases third parties’ knowledge about the public agent; therefore, the public agent knows
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Figure 5: This graph plots the cumulative probability (y axis) of a public agent’s beliefs about third
parties’ expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge (x axis): the blue solid line represents low-
scrutiny states, and red dotted line represents high-scrutiny states. The numerical simulation presents
rigidity R = 10, a normal distribution of benefits from an opportunistic challenge for third parties T˜0
with µ = 30, σ = 20 for low-scrutiny states and σ = 10 for high-scrutiny states, τ = ln[exp(1) + R]−1,
ζ = 1, and c = γR + 10, where γ = 0.2 and 10 are calibration parameters for an increase of c in
R. The likelihood of an opportunistic challenge ρ is the complementary cumulative probability of the
third parties’ expected benefits from the challenge being lower than the cost of the challenge, i.e, ρ =
1−Pr(T˜0 ln[exp(1)+R]
−1 < γR+10) = Pr(T˜0 ln[exp(1)+R]
−1−γR+10 ≥ 0). The distribution function
at high scrutiny (red dotted line) second-order stochastically dominates the distribution function at low
scrutiny (blue solid line). With all else kept constant, an increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the
likelihood of challenge ρ at low litigation costs c and to a reduction in ρ at high c.
better what third parties know. This more precise forecast, in turn, leads to a reassessment of
the distribution of the public agent’s beliefs about the benefits of an opportunistic challenge for
the third parties T˜ : depending on litigation costs, better informed third parties may increase
or decrease the likelihood of opportunistic challenges. As a result, it is equivocal whether open
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information policies (such as those in the State of California16 or the State of Berlin17) lead
to more efficient public contracts.
Proposition 5 An increase in scrutiny leads to an increase in the likelihood of an opportunis-
tic challenge when litigation costs are low and to a reduction in the likelihood of an opportunistic
challenge when litigation costs are high.
On the one hand, the literature has considered transparency as a means through which the
risk of corruption can be kept at bay by outsourcing the costly monitoring of the procurement
process (audit) to third parties (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; de Figueiredo, Spiller, and
Urbiztondo 1999; Prendergast 2003). On the other hand, facing greater transparency and
low litigation costs a public agent will ex ante readjust rigidity to a higher level to lower
the likelihood of opportunistic challenges. In this case, more transparency will lead to higher
contracting costs and lower government efficiency.
3.7 Political and Industrial Market Structure
Our framework accounts for political and market structure. If the political opposition is
fragmented, the challenger bears the litigation costs c, but any political competitor can get
16 California’s open information policy is rooted in the following legal acts:
(a) The California State Legislature’s Brown Act of 1953 guarantees the public’s right to attend and participate
in meetings of local legislative bodies. The Brown Act solely applies to California city and county government
agencies, boards, and councils.
(b) The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act of 1967 implements a provision of the California Constitution that
declares that “the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open
to public scrutiny,” and the Act explicitly mandates open meetings for California state agencies, boards,
and commissions. The Act facilitates accountability and transparency of government activities and protects
the rights of citizens to participate in state government deliberations.
(c) The California Public Records Act of 1968 mandates the disclosure of governmental records to the public
upon request, unless there is a specific reason not to do so. According to Article 1 of the California
Constitution and due to California Proposition 59 (the Sunshine Amendment), “the people have the right
of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.”
For California State Legislature Acts, see http://www.legislature.ca.gov/.
17 According to the amendment to the Freedom of Information Act of the State of Berlin of July
2010, all contracts must be made available to the public (see http://www.berlin.de/sen/finanzen/
and Alexander Dix, 2011, “Proactive Transparency for Public Services: the Berlin Model,”
http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/10/proactive-transparency-for-public-services-the-berlin-model/; accessed
December 5, 2011). The primary subject of this Act concerns access to contracts regarding the delivery of
basic public services to which the State of Berlin and private investors are parties. Additionally, in February
2011, the State of Berlin was forced by referendum to unconditionally disclose all contracts, decisions, and side
agreements associated with the partial privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities that were closed between the
State of Berlin and the private shareholders: see “Act for the full disclosure of secret contracts for the partial
privatization of the Berlin Water Utilities,” as of March 4, 2011, (GVBl. p. 82).
18
the benefits of a challenge; as ζ ≈ 0 (atomized political opposition), there will be no political
challenges because the litigation costs surpasses the expected benefits of a challenge, which
resembles a single party or autocratic system.
Challenges to an awarding procedure frequently arrive from a firm that is classified as
the second-best bidder and that would become the winner if it succeeded in disqualifying
the winning contractor. Analogously to a political opponent, a losing bidder will challenge a
contract output only if the expected benefits T˜ are higher than the litigation costs c. In this
case, ζ describes the challenger’s market structure: ζ = 1 for symmetrical Bertrand duopolies
(one’s contractor losses are another contractor’s gains), ζ < 1 for oligopolies, and ζ ≈ 0 for
perfect competition, where an individual competitor has no incentives to challenge a public
procurement outcome.
4 Contract Price Under Budget Constraints
A public agent budgets—explicitly through bidding information, announcements, and budget
notes, or implicitly through internal regulations—a maximum price P bud that she can pay a
contractor. The acceptable price-rigidity sets for a public agent are below P bud (i.e., upper
bound to keep contracts “in the budget”) and above rigidity R that makes political costs
bearable.
A contractor sees rigidity R and bids accordingly. On the contractor’s side, the acceptable
price-rigidity sets are those above her private adaptation costs Kpr. Therefore, the contracting
area (i.e., the set of prices acceptable to both the public agent and the contractor) is given
by price-rigidity combinations above Kpr and below P
bud. At a given R∗, the minimum price
required by a contractor is Pmin. Figure 4 plots the E(T ) and K curves, optimal rigidity, and
budgeted and minimum prices.
Before a bid, particularly in complex contracts, a public agent only has an estimation of a
contractor’s adaptation costs Kpr. If P
bud budgeted by the public agent is below the minimum
acceptable price Pmin = Kpr for the contractor at a given R
∗, then there will be no bidders,
or—if P bud is not known by the bidders—the bidders will bid P > P bud and the bid will be
annulled.
Therefore, “no contract” is a possible outcome if the political risks are significant and
the budgeted expenses are too low at a given rigidity. In such a case, the bid will have to be
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redesigned at a lower rigidity level at the risk of higher political costs for the public agent;
the budget will have to be reconsidered, which will create room for third-party challenges that
attempt to control budget expenses; or the terms must be negotiated after bidding, which
increases the political hazards for suspicion of collusion.
5 Applications and Supportive Evidence
Prevailing contract theories explain contractual rigidity as an optimal choice to: (a) foster price
competition among firms for simple contracts; (b) account for higher investments at the project
design stage for complex contracts (Bajari and Tadelis 2001);18 and/or (c) lower the risk of
ex post renegotiation and alleviate a double-sided hold-up problem by imposing ex ante rigid
limits on the parties’ ability to renegotiate contract terms (Boyne 2002; Prendergast 2003).
Our focus is on public procurement in politically contestable markets. We now apply
the TPO framework to settings in which a public agent faces a trade-off between contract
efficiency and political hazards. We analyze various comparative statics to derive the empirical
implications.
5.1 Bureaucracies
Rainey and Bozeman (2000) identified personnel as one of the areas where public agents show
sharp differences from business managers on perceptions about organizational formalization.
Civil servants are subject to more rigid contracts (e.g., regulated hiring and lists of duties and
responsibilities) than their peers in the private sector.19
A private company can hire whoever it wants and a typical employment contract may
simply say “follow the instructions of your principal,” whereas in most jurisdictions, the process
of employment of civil servants in government agencies is highly formalized and procedural, and
job responsibilities are detailed in bylaws and the internal regulations of the agency involved
and subject to independent audits (Horn 1995).20 Both specific employment procedures and
18 The use of more rigid awarding procedures in continental Europe compared with the UK is often associated
with differences in their investments at the project design stage. See, e.g., Hermes and Michel (2006), Sforzi and
Michel (2005), and Winch and Campagnac (1995). See also comparative reports of Bianchi and Guidi (2010),
Rangone (2008), and the OECD (2007): “Public procurement review and remedies systems in the European
Union,” Sigma Papers 41.
19 In this instance, civil servants as individuals are the private party contracting with the public agent.
20 For example, controls may be overseen by the Government Accountability Office in the USA, the Australian
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rigid contracts in the civil service are aimed at avoiding challenges related to favoritism (Horn
1995), but nonetheless result in bureaucracies with less discretion and creative solutions, and
lower productivity compared to the private sector (which is analogous to higher prices in public
procurement).
The adaptation of personnel procedures to potential third-party challenges provides a
consistent explanation of civil service “inefficiencies” in politically contestable markets that is
complementary to the public administration perspective on red tape (Bozeman 1993).21
5.2 External Consultants and Certification of Contractors
The engagement of independent consultants (including multilateral agencies and international
advisers, particularly in countries with weak legal systems) strengthens the objectivity of pro-
curement processes and prevents third-party challenges that cooperation between public agents
and private contractors has become collusive. The use of external consultants, however, comes
at a cost.
Similarly, many public bids require the certification of contractors and subcontractors,
which increases contract rigidity and the price of the bid.22
With external consultants and the certification of contractors, the implicit aim is to de-
crease the likelihood of opportunistic challenges ρ by lowering their likelihood of success τ and
increasing the cost c of protesting. In other words, there is a trade-off for the public agent
between lower political hazards (downward shift of E(T )) and the additional contracting costs
of external consultants and certification (upward shift of K). Therefore, the public agent will
employ external consultants and require certification when they sufficiently lower the political
costs E(T ) in comparison to the additional contracting costs K.
National Audit Office in Australia, the Tribunal de Contas da Unia˜o in Brazil, or the Bundesrechnungshof in
Germany, to name a few.
21 See also Laffont and Tirole (1991), Pfiffner (1987), and Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994).
22 For example, in May 2010 a public procurement for the “Canal Safety and Drainage Improve-
ments Project” in Antioch, Pittsburg, Bay Point, Clyde, and Walnut Creek (California), procured by
the Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, was objected to by JMB Construction (see
http://www.ccwater.com/buscenter/109067\ results.pdf; accessed May 28, 2010). JMB Construction argued
that the apparent low bidder Con-Quest Contractors included a non-certified subcontractor. According to the
Contra Costa Water District Construction Department, the relevance of the works that the alleged subcontrac-
tor would provide was minimal for the overall project; however, the challenger argued that the inclusion of a
non-certified subcontractor allowed Con-Quest Contractors to bid a lower price ($756,000 compared with JMB
Construction’s $852,000, i.e., 11 percent cheaper) than if it had included only certified subcontractors.
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5.3 Fixed-Price versus Cost-Plus Contracts
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) examined the incentives for contractual parties to design agree-
ments that are left intentionally incomplete with regard to future duties or contingencies. On
the one hand, rigid contracts (e.g., fixed-price contracts) mitigate ex post opportunism and
the associated distortions in unobservable investment, but at the cost of additional resources
expended in ex post design. On the other hand, flexible contracts (e.g., cost-plus contracts)
allow for opportunistic behavior, but are less costly in their design.
In like manner, Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2009) considered the determinants of the
choice between auctions (i.e., a rigid procedure) and negotiations (i.e., a discretionary proce-
dure). Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete,
and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions may stifle communication between
buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when design-
ing the project.
In theory, then, fixed-price contracts are preferable when the adverse selection problem
decreases relative to the moral hazard problem (e.g., in the procurement of standardized goods
and services or in projects involving a low level of informational asymmetry between the con-
tracting parties), whereas cost-plus contracts are preferable in complex projects when the
adverse selection problem increases relative to the moral hazard problem—i.e., when uncer-
tainties related to technological requirements are unknown and bigger than the inefficiencies
arising from incomplete monitoring and insulation of the contractor from cost overruns (Loeb
and Surysekar 1994).
In practice, cost-plus contracts in the public sphere have been criticized for frequent and
substantial cost overruns in government spending.23 Cost-plus contracts are more adaptable
but also more abusable24 and subject to shading (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder 2011). Moreover,
the Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Gov-
23 A U.S. Government Accountability Office’s study of 95 major defense acquisition projects found cost
overruns of 26 percent, which totaled $295 billion over the life of the projects. Cf. U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (2008, March): “Defense acquisitions. assessments of selected weapon programs.” Report to
Congressional Committees, Washington, D.C.
24 Cost-plus contracts are understood as a “blank check” for contractors and the root cause of procure-
ment inefficiencies. A notable exception is the case of London’s Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, which was
delivered on schedule and under budget under a cost-plus regime (see http://www.airport-technology.com/
projects/heathrow5/ (accessed July 10, 2011).
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ernment Contracting explicitly stated that “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type
contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts shall be used only when circumstances do not allow
the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract.”25
Procurement laws normally allow public agents to design of public procurement projects
based on a menu of price, technical, and quality criteria. Public agents are given discretion
regarding the choice of criteria and the weights of those criteria in the final decision scoring.
However, there is a strong affinity for the price criterion when accountability, scrutiny, and
their attached political hazards are high. In France, only 1.9 percent of all public bids include
soft clauses.26 In pre-EU Poland, most public contracts were procured based on a menu of
objective and discretionary criteria: 39 percent of public bids were based on the lowest price
bidder single criterion in 2002 and 51 percent in 2003. After Poland enter the EU in mid
2004, the lowest price bidder as the single criterion increased to 53 percent in 2005, 64 percent
in 2006, 87 percent in 2007, 84 percent in 2008, 90 percent in 2009, and 91 percent in 2010
(Jarzyn´ski 2011). This shift in preference for fixed-price bidding seems to be the result of
the increased frequency and complexity of audits after Poland joined the European Union,
i.e., public agents preferred to include technical and quality parameters in specifications and
rely on the more “objective, clear, and accountable”—less contestable—price criterion for bid
selection to avoid TPO.27
Fixed-price contracts do not provide adaptable risk-sharing mechanisms and may lead to
an unintended increase in government payments.28 With closer third-party oversight and a
fear of political challenges,29 public agents will prefer fixed-price contracts in settings in which
25 See Presidential Memorandum of March 4, 2009, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
on Government Contracting, retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Memorandum-for-the-
Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Government/ (accessed July 11, 2011).
26 Cf. Ministere de l’E´conomie des Finances et de l’Industrie (2010). “Le recensement des marche´s publics
en 2009.” Technical report, Observatoire Economique de l’Achat Public.
27 Similarly, Cai, Henderson, and Zhang (2013) discuss how Chinese local officials respond to a new party
secretary appointment and inquiries into local corruption on land transactions conducted by the city govern-
ment, the Party, or the National Audit Office. Investigations can lead to removal, indictment, and/or criminal
charges against local officials. When faced with increased political risks, local officials responded by temporarily
increasing the use of English auctions, the most rigid mechanism they can apply.
28 See also Tony Purton, “The case for a return to ‘cost plus’,” Defense Viewpoints, March 24, 2007,
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/the-case-for-a-return-to cost-plus (accessed July 10,
2011).
29 As stated in the Presidential Memorandum of March 4, 2009 (op. cit.), “reports by agency Inspectors
General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other independent reviewing bodies have shown that
non-competitive and cost-reimbursement contracts have been misused, resulting in wasted taxpayer resources,
poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability for results,” and “improved contract oversight could
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cost-plus contracts could prove to be more efficient.
5.4 Privatizations of Government-Owned Enterprises
Privatizations of government-owned companies are typically subject to clauses of commitment
by the private acquirer concerning labor retention, modernization processes, future invest-
ments, and other politically sensitive issues that impose higher contracting and adaptation
costs. On the one hand, rigid privatization contracts (high R) are used because of the fear
of challenges to the incumbent public agent by labor unions, the local community, and the
political opposition. To minimize opportunistic challenges to privatizations, public agents em-
bed clauses and golden shares in privatization contracts to limit the discretion and “cream
skimming” (Kolderie 1986) of the private investor.
On the other hand, such privatization clauses curb the company’s governance and conse-
quently lower its selling price (i.e., analogously to a high price for a public procurement). If
the privatization proceeds are low, the public agent will be accused of incompetence and of
“selling off the family silver” (Kolderie 1986), which implies a high expected political cost for
the public agent.
The corollary is that in politically contestable markets, privatizations appear as too costly
politically from the public agent’s standpoint and as too expensive and over-rigid from a
private manager’s perspective. Thus, privatizations and public-private partnerships (Iossa and
Martimort 2015) are less likely to occur in politically contested markets in which the expected
political costs E(T ) are prohibitive for the public agent.
5.5 Federal Bid Protest Mechanisms and Strategic Sourcing
U.S. executive departments and agencies spend over $500 billion annually to purchase goods
and services.30 To mitigate favoritism in the source selection process, Congress introduced bid
protest mechanisms, i.e., a “fire alarm” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989) to contest the
outcome of a source selection decision (before or after the award) by third parties, generally
by rejected bidders.
reduce such sums significantly” (emphasis added).
30 See U.S. Office of Management and Budget memorandum on “Improving Acquisition through
Strategic Sourcing,” issued on December 5, 2012 and available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-02 0.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016).
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In anticipation of potential third-party challenges, federal agency managers increase the
rigidity of the procurement process, which leads to higher prices. Moreover, according to
Maser, Subbotin, and Thompson (2012), the outcomes of the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) bid protests appear to be biased in favor of the constituents of congressional leaders.
Contested congressional leaders may favor constituency interests (e.g., domestic producers)
where political competition is tight, which exacerbates bid protests from excluded bidders.
Recently, there has been a range of efforts to move federal agencies out of the polit-
ical arena, toward strategic sourcing to cut unnecessary contractual rigidity and save tax-
payer dollars by pooling agencies’ spending—either centralizing contracting decisions or using
government-wide strategic sourcing vehicles—in order to lower prices and reduce duplication
and administrative costs. For example, since being put into place in 2010, government-wide
contracts for office supplies have saved over $140 million by offering lower prices than any
single agency could negotiate on its own. Similar vehicles for domestic delivery services saved
over $31 million in 2011 over what agencies were paying under previous agreements.31
6 Concluding Remarks
We combine political hazards and transaction costs to explain the apparent inefficiencies in
public contracts. High ex ante payment volatility or ex post flexibility in implementation
can trigger opportunistic challenges from third parties that lead to contract failures or costly
adaptations by public officials in terms of time or political career. A paramount conclusion
of our analysis is that public contracts cannot be directly compared with private contracts to
assess their efficiency. Instead, public contracts should be compared with analogous public
contracts in similar political environments and should be able to pass Williamson’s “remedi-
ableness criterion,” which holds that “an extant mode of organization for which no superior
feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed to
be efficient” (Williamson 1999, 316; the emphasis is in the original).
The fact that third-party oversight makes public contracting more expensive and rigid
than private contracting, however, does not indicate that transferring those activities to the
31 Cf. U.S. Office of Management and Budget memorandum on “Improving Acquisition through
Strategic Sourcing,” issued on December 5, 2012 and available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-02 0.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016).
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private sector would reduce the political risks and therefore make the activities more efficient.
Public procurement is used for “hard” agency problems where consumers cannot be trusted
and “when bureaucracies work poorly, [but] consumer choice works worse” (Prendergast 2003,
930–933). As Williamson (1999) indicates, certain transactions have special needs for probity
and require the security of the state, and transferring public functions to the private sector
(i.e., minimizing the scope of the state) itself involves political hazards, making such transfers
hardly preferable for public agents over public contracting itself.
In this paper, we have analyzed public procurement in a variety of environments to show
that many of its outer features can be understood as adaptations to the hazards of political
contestability and third-party scrutiny that are prevalent in public contracting. Empirical
predictions of the TPO hypothesis include: (a) contracts subject to public scrutiny are more
rigid than purely private-to-private (i.e., relational) contracts32 and (b) in the sub-sample of
public contracts, rigidity increases with political contestability.
32 See, e.g., Moszoro, Spiller, and Stolorz (2016) for a comparison of rigidity terms in contracts in regulated
versus non-regulated industries.
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Appendix A Notation
Variable Formula Meaning
c Cost of challenge and litigation for third parties
E(T ) T0ρτ Expected political costs from third-party challenges
F (·), f(·) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density
function (PDF)
K Kpr +Kpu Adaptation costs, compound of costs borne by the contractor Kpr
and costs borne by the public agent Kpu
P Price bid by the contractor
P bud Price budgeted by the public agent (reservation price)
Pmin ≥ Kpr Minimum acceptable price by the contractor
q Third parties binary decision variable: q = 1 when a contract protest
is placed; q = 0 otherwise
R∗ Optimal contract rigidity
T0 Political costs for the public agent if the challenge succeeds
T˜0 T˜0 ∼ N (µ, σ
2) Random variable of third parties’ benefits from an opportunistic chal-
lenge, distributed normally with mean µ and variance σ2
T˜ T˜0ζτ Distribution of expected benefits for an opportunistic challenger
T0 Particular value of T˜0, known to third parties but unobserved by the
public agent
ρ Pr(T˜ > c) Likelihood of third-party opportunistic challenges
τ Likelihood of success of third-party opportunistic challenges
ζ Political (market) concentration
Abbreviation Meaning
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office
KPI Key Performance Indicator
OMB U.S. Office of Management and Budget
PPP Public–Private Partnership
PSC Public Sector Comparator
TPO Third-Party Opportunism
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Appendix B Proofs
Appendix B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Method 1 (Blackwell’s theorem):
Consider a court’s finite set of actions A = {guilty, not-guilty}, and a finite set of states of
the world S = {guilty, not-guilty}. The prior is a probability distribution p(s) in ∆(S). The
court’s payoff is given by a real valued payoff function u(a, s), such that u = 1 if a = s (i.e.,
right decision) and zero otherwise, and U is the set of such payoff functions.
Consider, arguendo, a contract as an experiment characterized by clauses x, with finite
support X and a joint distribution on function D on X × S with marginal p(·) on S. When
the court can observe the realization of the contractual clauses x, but not that of states of the
world s, she has access to mixed strategies σ(a|x), with
∑
a σ(a|x) = 1 for all x. Let
∑
(D) be
the set of strategies accessible to the court endowed with contract D.
Ultimately, the court only cares about the joint distributions of actions and states of the
world φ(a, s). Let Φ(D) be the set of joint distributions she can generate when endowed with
policy space D. This policy space is restricted by her lack of knowledge in the following way:
Φ(D) =
{
φ(a, s) : ∃σ ∈
∑
(D), φ(a, s) =
∑
x
σ(a|x)D(x, s)
}
(2)
Then the court’s problem u endowed with contract D is given by the following linear program:
V (D,u) = max
φ∈Φ(D)
∑
a,s
φ(a, s)u(a, s) (3)
A contract D is more useful than another contract D′ (D ≻ D′) if the court gets a higher
value V when endowed with contract D than when endowed with contact D′, i.e.:
D ≻ D′ ⇔ V (D,u) ≥ V (D′, u), ∀u ∈ U (4)
Let’s callD the “rigid contract” andD′ its “flexible” binary garble (see Perez-Richet 2017).
By the Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell 1953; Cre´mer 1982), the rigid contract is preferred to
any garble since it is more informative and the court’s decision will be closer to the true state.
In reverse, the further the garble from D, the higher the likelihood that an opportunistic
challenge will succeed at court.
Method 2 (random court):
Without loss of generality, consider a project D characterized by k > 0 irreproachable clauses
and l > 0 dubious clauses at court such that D = {1, 2, . . . , k, . . . , k + l}, and a simple court
technology, where a challenge is successful (τ = 1) if the court randomly checks and finds a
dubious clause. Thus, the a priori probability of a successful challenge at court is τ = l/(k+ l).
In a second stage before court, the politician can add R > 0 ancillary clauses or clauses that
redundantly specify previous ones, but are indifferent at court, such thatD = {1, 2, . . . , k, . . . , k+
l, . . . , k + l + R}. Thence, if a challenge is submitted to court, the a posteriori probability of
a successful opportunistic challenge is τ = l/(k + l + R). Differentiating τ regarding R yields
∂τ
∂R
< 0 and ∂
2τ
∂R2
> 0.
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Appendix B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Third parties’ choice of opportunistic challenge q is such that q = 1 if the expected returns of
TPO are positive, i.e., T˜0ζτ(R) > c(R). From the public agent’s perspective, ρ is the expected
value of the random realization of q:
E(q | R) ≡ Pr
[
T˜0ζτ(R)− c(R) > 0
]
≡ ρ (5)
Given that ∂τ
∂R
< 0 and ∂c
∂R
≥ 0,
∂ρ
∂R
= f
[
T˜0ζτ(R)− c(R)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
T˜0ζ
∂τ
∂R︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−
∂c
∂R︸︷︷︸
≥0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≤ 0 (6)
Appendix B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let F (T˜0) ∼ N (µ, σ
2) be the twice-differentiable normal distribution of T˜0 with mean µ and
standard deviation σ. From the linear transformation property of normal distributions, let
f
[
T˜0ζτ − c; ζτµ− c, (ζτ)
2σ2
]
.
E(T ) decreases in R—from Proposition 2:
∂E(T )
∂R
= T0
(
τ
∂ρ
∂R
+ ρ
∂τ
∂R
)
< 0 (7)
E(T ) is locally convex in R:
∂2E(T )
∂R2
= T0
(
τ
∂2ρ
∂R2︸ ︷︷ ︸
See Eq 9
+2
∂ρ
∂R
∂τ
∂R
+ ρ
∂2τ
∂R2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
(8)
Differentiating Equation 6 with respect to R:
∂2ρ
∂R2
=
∂f(·)
∂R
(
T˜0ζ
∂τ
∂R
−
∂c
∂R
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ f(·)
(
T˜0ζ
∂2τ
∂R2
−
∂2c
∂R2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(9)
Replacing Equation 9 in Equation 8:
∂2E(T )
∂R2
 ≥ 0 for −∂f(·)∂R ≤
τf(·)
(
T˜0ζ
∂2τ
∂R2
− ∂
2c
∂R2
)
+2 ∂ρ
∂R
∂τ
∂R
+ρ ∂
2τ
∂R2
τ(T˜0ζ ∂τ∂R−
∂c
∂R)
2
< 0 otherwise (locally concave)
(10)
E(T ) is globally convex in R—from Propositions 1 and 2:
lim
R→0+
∂E(T )
∂R
< lim
R→∞
∂E(T )
∂R
= 0 and lim
R→0+
∂2E(T )
∂R2
> lim
R→∞
∂2E(T )
∂R2
= 0 (11)
29
Appendix B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is analogous to the proof of Harberger’s triangle (Harberger 1971; Judd 1987).
Let ηQ = −
dQ
dR
P
Q
be the effect of a 1% increase in the baseline price due to a change in
contractual rigidity dR on equilibrium quantity (i.e., the elasticity version of incidence formula).
Let us define adaptation cost K using change in quantity and change in price:
K = −
(
1
2
)
dQdR (12)
i.e., the marginal adaptation cost K is equal to the wedge generated by the marginal quantity
demand loss dQ times the marginal increase in rigidity dR.
Multiplying both sides of equation (12) by equality 1 = dR/dR · P/Q ·Q/P :
K = −
(
1
2
)
dQ
dR
(
P
Q
)(
Q
P
)
dR · dR (13)
and plugging ηQ into equation (13), we obtain:
K =
1
2
ηQ
(
Q
P
)
dR2 (14)
Therefore, K is increasing and strictly convex in R.
Appendix B.5 Proof of Lemma 1
For limR→0+
∂[E(T )+K]
∂R
≥ 0, R∗ = 0 (e.g., relational contracting). Otherwise, because | limR→0
∂E(T )
∂R
| >
limR→0
∂K
∂R
and | limR→∞
∂E(T )
∂R
| < limR→∞
∂K
∂R
∃R∗ ∈ (0,∞) : R∗ = argminR[E(T (R)) +
K(P,R)] and ∂[E(T (R
∗))+K(R∗)]
∂R
= 0.
Appendix B.6 Proof of Corollary 1
This proof follows from Lemma 1 and the discussion provided in the text.
Appendix B.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Let σL > σH be the standard deviation and let ρL, ρH be the likelihood of a challenge at low
and high scrutiny respectively.
Recalling Equation 5,
ρL,H = Pr
[
T˜0ζτ(R)− c(R) > 0
]
(15)
for F (T˜0) ∼ N (µ, (σ
L,H)2). Thus F (T˜ )L,H ∼ N (ζτµ, (ζτσL,H)2) are the CDF of third parties’
expected benefits from an opportunistic challenge at low and high scrutiny respectively.
From the mean-preserving spread property F (T˜ )L,H at low and high scrutiny:
(a) If c = ζτµ, then ρL = ρH
(b) If c < ζτµ, then ρL < ρH
(c) If c > ζτµ, then ρL > ρH
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